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ABSTRACT
Actors making public decisions about a certain policy issue in one particular arena
also meet in other arenas where they will have to make decisions on other issues. By
incorporating information from across coevolving arenas, actors make associations
between the decisions in the different arenas. To understand the dynamics of
associations, we deployed a formal game-theoretic approach and run an experiment.
Subjects played two different games, each representing a different decision-making
arena. The results show that history builds-up and that subjects made associations
between the two games, partly explaining the behaviour of decision-makers inter-
acting in multilevel decision-making settings.
KEYWORDS Decision-making; experiment; game theory; association; arena
1. Introduction
Inspired by the successes of the Japanese Shinkansen trains in the 1960s and the
French and German high-speed trains later, the Dutch government decided that they
also wanted high-speed rail (Gerrits and Marks 2014; Gerrits et al. 2014; Marks and
Gerrits 2017). In the early 1990s, the plans developed into the HSL-Zuid high-speed
project. The planning and construction lasted for about 20 years before becoming
operational. One persistent issue in the decision-making was the track alignment
across the border between Belgium and the Netherlands. The Dutch preferred a
crossing point that would be more cost efficient for them than for the Belgians.
Naturally, the Belgians demanded a crossing point that would be cheaper for them
but more expensive for the Dutch. The decision-making in this arena concerning the
cross-border alignment lasted about a decade.
These two governments were also entangled in long-lasting dispute about an
unrelated issue; deepening of the Dutch Westerschelde estuary. The Belgian port of
Antwerp cannot be reached by ships because the estuary’s shallow depth. Dredging
could solve the problem but the Belgians would need permission for this from the
Dutch, who are reluctant to give that permission out of fears of environmental
damage as well as not being eager to give Antwerp a competitive advantage over
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Dutch ports. The decision-making in the arena concerning the Westerschelde lasted
for about 15 years (Meijerink 1999; Gerrits 2012).
These two unrelated decision-making processes become coupled because the
representatives of both governments met each other in both arenas and took with
them the history build-up from one arena to the other. The decision-making was
concluded when the Belgian minister Van den Brande agreed about the Dutch
preferred crossing point at the Belgian border in exchange for a Dutch permission
to deepen the Westerschelde. Both complex decision-making processes become
coupled due to actors acting and interacting in one arena, then meeting again in
the other one. Naturally, they carry over the dynamics from the one arena to the
other one. In other words: actors making collective decisions about a certain issue in
one particular arena also meet in other arenas where they have to make collective
decisions on other issues. This history and the associations these actors can make
when moving between the different arenas helped lifting the deadlock.
We investigate the relationship between the actors’ internal models, history build-
up and the decision-making in coupled arenas. We develop and test a complexity-
informed game-theoretic model that tests the relationship between actors interacting
over time in different arenas in an experimental setting as a succinct proxy for
collective decision-making in multiple arenas. The research question is: how do
interacting actors make associations between their decisions in two coupled arenas
and how does that association influence the outcomes?
Following Holland’s work (1995, 2012), but also e.g. Knott, Miller, and Verkuilen
(2003), Henry, Lubell, and McCoyy (2011), and Lavertu and Moynihan (2013), we
first develop a formal game theoretic model, the so-called associative approach
(Marks 2002). The associative approach is a mathematical model that structures the
ways in which actors interacting in one arena, and the history associated with that
interaction, influence the decisions made in other coupled arenas. Second, we carry
out an experiment to test the associative approach (cf. e.g. Axelrod 1984, 1997; on the
merits of game theoretical models in studying complex systems, and e.g. Molm 1990,
Lavertu and Moynihan 2013; for a discussion of the merits of experimental
approaches in social sciences and in public administration in particular).
Controlled experiments allow comparison of players’ decisions in equivalent condi-
tions, holding other factors constant making it possible to disentangle the effects of
associations between decisions in coupled arenas (cf. Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson
2000). The use of experimental methods in understanding complex decision-making
processes may form ‘a useful part of the apparatus for moving from the level of the
individual actor to the behaviour of the system, ultimately yielding testable theories to
explain the endogenous generation of macro behaviour from the microstructure of
human systems.’ (Sterman 1989, 228).
We acknowledge that some readers unfamiliar with mathematics and game theory
will find the model quite abstract and possibly difficult to understand. We have
therefore put a description of the model in the main text with limited references to
mathematics. The full mathematical model is presented in the Appendix. The text is
structured into five sections: (1) the formal game theoretic model of associations
between decisions, (2) the experimental design and laboratory setting, (3) the results
of the experiment, (4) a discussion about the implications of the results to collective
decision-making, and (5) the main conclusions regarding decision-making in com-
plex coupled arena’s.
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2. Associations between decisions
The perception of what other actors want to achieve, and how they want to achieve it,
influences actor decisions. Naturally, decision-makers such as politicians and admin-
istrators want to push through their preferred problem and solution definitions.
However, conflicts between the various problem-solution combinations mean that
not all wishes can be fulfilled and certain combinations will prevail over others.
Decision-makers will seek alignment with some partners, and increase distances with
opponents if they think this will help further their particular problem-solution
combination for that issue. As Knott, Miller and Verkuilen state in the realm of
public policy:
‘There has been much literature written on decision-making in decentralized environments
with limited information. Decision-makers are limited in both what they can control in the
decision domain and what information they can obtain. Under these circumstances, decision-
makers adapt to decisions made by others in a decision process, not a singular event. The
overall outcome of the decision process is the collective result of the interactions among
decision-makers.’ (2003, 341)
The above quote is our starting point for expansion on the complexity of decision-
making process in multiple arenas. Actors not only have to deal with limited informa-
tion (Simon 1955), they also have to act in various different decision-making arenas
where they encounter people from different public organizations as well as stake-
holders (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Klijn and Koppenjan 2015). This establishes
coupling between arenas.
The coupling can be strong when most of the actors from arena 1 (such as the
HSL-Zuid arena) also meet in arena 2 (such as the Westerschelde arena), or weak
when there is little overlap between the actors in arena 1 and 2. Due to the connec-
tions between actors and the decisions they make, a history of collective decision-
making is built up. For example, certain actors may find it easier to cooperate now
due to the fact that they have done so successfully in the past; or, conversely, more
difficult because they carry negative experiences from the past. These history build-
ups influence collective decision-making processes in various arenas. By incorporat-
ing information from history build-up in the collective decision-making process,
actors construct internal models (Holland 1995; Allen, Strathern, and Varga 2010).
As such, they make associations between the decisions in the different arenas that
have become coupled (Marks 2002).
The internal model forms the basic building block that drives that emergence of
complexity (Holland 1995). The continuous interaction between actors on the basis
of their internal models within and across arenas builds a complex situation over
time, as well as cements their behavioural rules if they return acceptable results. The
actions of individuals are guided by an interpretative framework that includes both
beliefs about the functioning of system and its components, but also the values or
goals that are aimed for (Allen, Strathern, and Varga 2010, 55). As another complex-
ity scholar puts it:
‘Our information processing capacity is limited and that humans employ biases and heuristics
(e.g. anchoring and adjustment, the representativeness heuristic, and the availability heuristic)
in order to reduce mental effort.’ (Vennix 1999, 381)
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The actors make sense of the world by making associations between different
decision settings. This helps them handling the complexity of coupled arenas. At
the same time, the same associations and subsequent coupledness appear to increase
the complexity of decision-making considerably in comparison to situations were all
arenas are fully isolated. As such, associations lower the individual perception of
complexity as well as drive the complexity on the macro-level. Naturally, it some-
times pays off to pursue a complexity absorptive response to a complex environment
(cf. Ashmos, Duchon, and McDaniel 2000) because complexity needs to be mirrored
with complexity as per Ashby’s law of requisite variety. The counter-argument is that
the associations help actors in dealing with the complexity of different settings by
providing a focal point, i.e. the associations reduce the complexity of the situations
for the actors. This is inevitable when working within complex adaptive systems (e.g.
Lefebure and Letiche 1999; Boisot 2000; Cooksey 2000), even if it risks over-simpli-
fication (Beahrs 1992; Strand 2002; Morçöl 2002). In short, the complexity of situa-
tion leads actors to respond in ways that allow them to deal with that complexity
within an arena, while simultaneously contributing to that complexity across arenas.
In Holland’s own words:
‘[. . .] agents are defined by an enclosing boundary that accepts some signals and ignores
others, a “program” inside the boundary for processing and sending signals, and mechanisms
for changing (adapting) this program in response to the agents’ accumulating experience.
Once the signal/boundary agents have been defined, they must be situated to allow for
positioning of the relevant signals and boundaries.’ (2012, 24).
2.1. Decision-making dynamics from a game-theoretic perspective
One of the main methods of inquiry in the complexity sciences is modelling using
behavioural rules derived from game theory. Game theoretical models have been
proven to be especially helpful when studying complex systems in terms of interac-
tions and emergent properties. For example Axelrod (1984, 1997) and Holland (1995)
used the prisoner’s dilemma to demonstrate the mechanisms of complex systems, and
Kauffman (1993) needed game theory to make his fitness landscape models work.
Game theory concerns the formal modelling of strategic interaction between indivi-
duals and many social phenomenon can be presented in terms of games (cf.
Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 1995, 1). As such, it is a tool that helps to clarify
issues relating to human behaviour and social institutions.
For the present purpose, game theory gives us a device with which we can
investigate how interactions between decision-makers can build complex situations
across decision-making arenas. When two decision-makers try to reach a collective
decision, they will have to interact. Such a situation can be modelled as a particular
two-person game. Games can vary from dominated strategy to coordination games,
or from prisoner dilemma to zero-sum games, depending on the payoff structure
associated with the possible choices for these decision-makers. However, as we said
above, decision-makers don’t operate in a vacuum. They may meet again in other
arenas where they have to decide on another policy issue. In game-theoretical terms,
it may be that the new interaction setting will have the same payoff structure as in the
first game, but hardly ever are two games exactly the same (cf. Sugden 1986, 50).
When decision-making in one arena is followed by decision-making in another
coupled arena, the decision-makers play different kinds of games after each other.
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Model building inevitably means reducing some of the complexity associated with
the messy character of real-world collective decision-making. However, simplifica-
tions in a model help focusing on the core-mechanics of decision-making in coupled
arenas (cf. e.g. Friedman 1953; Sober 1994). Our model assumes that only two players
will make a decision (cf. Knott, Miller, and Verkuilen 2003). History is introduced by
letting these two players play two games in a row, the second game being completely
different from the previous one, as if they were making collective decisions in two
different but coupled arenas. The essential point is that the history that two players
create together through their interaction in the first game or arena provides informa-
tion for the decision in the second game or arena, i.e. the results from the previous
game build an internal model (Holland 1995) and create a focal point for the latter
game (see Schelling 1960). Rational players will use the asymmetries created through
their interactions to formulate their strategies (Bacharach 1993; Janssen 2001).
2.2. The associative approach
Naturally, players see a resemblance between the former and latter game. By incor-
porating information from the first game into the second, players make an associa-
tion between the decisions in the two games, i.e. the games become coupled through
this association. There are many different ways players can make associations
between multiple games, of which some are more prominent than others (cf.
Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994a, 1994b). That is, every player conceives the
game being played differently, which then becomes a variable in the two-person
decision problem (cf. Bacharach 1993; Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997). Given the
limited cognitive capacities of players, a preceding but different game can be more
prominent than a repeated (same) game for helping them solve the latter games. The
external information of the preceding different game can be more prominent because
it is more readily accessible (cf. Young 1996, 1998). This information can break the
symmetry of a second game and thus raise the chance of coordination (cf. Bhaskar
1997). The associations between games as made by the players induce asymmetries
between strategies. That is, the former game can create a focal point in the latter.
Players can make many different associations depending on what external informa-
tion they process and in which manner they do so. Prominence is ‘created’ by players
having certain associations in their frame, while not having others. In short, when
players or actors move from one arena to the other, they can negotiate the complexity
of doing so by relying on prominence.
We will present the model here as narrative; see Appendix for the full formal
model. Players have a given set of possible actions they can undertake. Based on the
connection with a previous different game, players make associations for the deci-
sions they can make in the current game. The association means that the initial set of
possible actions becomes partitioned, i.e. the decisions can be categorized using the
associations the players make. Not all associations will help a player in categorizing
the decision set, or certain associations come to mind easier (cf. bounded rationality,
Simon 1955). The different associations may be thought of as the frame through
which a player looks at the problem. (Bacharach 1993). This frame F is a subset of the
partitioned set of possible actions. Naturally, players believe that they consider all
possible associations because they are not capable of thinking of associations existing
outside their frame F. In other words, players optimize their behaviour on the actions
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they think are possible and that are always restricted to their frame F. Of course a
player has beliefs about the possible associations the other player can use. Players
tend to think that their strategy is more sophisticated than the strategy of the other
player (Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004). As such, a player believes that the other
player holds the same associations as himself, or less, i.e. the other player is said to be
type G, G ⊆ F. Given that the player is of type F, the conditional probability that the
other player is of type G is denoted by V(G | F). The availability of association β is
denoted by vβ, hence an association β that is not available is denoted by (1 vβ). Players
will try to maximize their returns by making the decision from the set of possible
actions that is partitioned due to the associations the players has and beliefs of
associations the other player has. This is the model in a nutshell.
3. Design of the experiment
We carried out an experiment mimicking actors operating in two different arenas.
The experiment consists of two different games played after each other, each game
being a proxy for a decision-making arena of a different type with the same actors
engaging in collective decision-making. The first game was the hash-mark game, the
second a distribution game.
The hash-mark game consists of 17 vertical hash-marks. Starting players are
randomly assigned for each play of the game. Each player must on each, turn
alternating with the other player, cross out 1, 2, 3, or 4 hash-marks. The game
continues until all hash-marks have been crossed out. The person who crosses out
the last hash-mark loses the game.
The second game is the distribution game, also called battle-of-the-sexes game
(BOS-game). In the BOS-game, participants choose between two alternatives without
being able to communicate with each other. If both participants choose mutually
consistent alternatives, i.e. distributing the reward in the same way between them,
they will get the amount prescribed by their chosen alternative. This amount will then
be added up to their individual total earnings for the experiment. The alternatives
they can choose differ in the two versions of the experiment. In the first version there
is only a financial reward in the last game of the two, while in the second version both
games have a financial reward. In both versions, 48 first year students from different
faculties of the [university name blanked for review purposes] participated, distrib-
uted over four different sessions. Only students with no knowledge about game
theory or theories of decision-making could participate to create a level playing
field. Student anonymity was guaranteed and it was also promised that all the
money they would make by playing the games would be paid in cash right after
the experiment in private to prevent the other participants from feeling envious
regarding how others played.
Each subject was randomly and anonymously drawn and were of type Ai or type
Bi (i = 1,. . ., 7). The type A players were put in one room and the type B-players in
the other. Each type A player would play another type B player exactly once. As the
opponents were in different rooms they have no way of communicating with each
other. In total, the participants played the combination five or six times in one
session. The randomization is done to break up any groups of friends, and to make
sure all the participants know that they are playing a real but unknown opponent.
The subjects were informed that the subject pool consists of volunteers from various
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faculties. They were told that the experiment concerns the study of behaviour in
interaction situations. This statement of purpose is necessary because it satisfies their
curiosity about why someone is willing to pay them money for playing games. The
statement is specific enough, yet, broad enough to avoid any ‘demand effects’. The
experiment starts with a test to see whether the participants understand the rules of
the games, and thus lowering the opportunities for confusion during the experiment.
In both versions of the experiment, the outcome of the first game is common
knowledge for both players. However, the subjects do not know whom they are
playing. They only know that they are playing an opponent in the other room. Also
in both versions, the outcome of the second game in the combination is privately
revealed to every player, because the payment of the subjects is based on this
outcome.
3.1. Experiment 1
No matter whether you are the winner or the loser of the hash-mark game the
financial gain is zero. The money that has to be agreed upon for distribution in the
second game is 10 euro, specified in two alternatives:
Alt 1. You get € 3.- and your co player gets € 7.-.
Alt 2. You get € 7.- and your co player gets € 3.-.
If players have no extra information available, they have no conclusive reason to
choose one alternative over another, because they know their opponent has the same
problem and this is then common knowledge. In a large population, the expected
outcome by traditional game theory will be that the players mix their strategies: alter-
native 1 will be played in 30 per cent of the cases, and alternative 2 in 70 per cent of the
cases, resulting in matching and mismatching of alternatives as given in Table 1.
The associative approach predicts that players will make different choices due to
their framing based on the information from playing the hash-mark game prior to
the BOS-game. This extra information may cause players to attribute a dominant
position to the winner and a subservient position to the loser of the hash-mark game
in the distribution game, based on the so-called Lockean principle of distributive
justice (see Locke [1690] 1986; Hoffman and Spitzer 1985). Players frame the winner
as more entitled to a larger share. That is, players in such settings think it is ‘normal’
for the winner to claim the larger share in the distribution game, and that it is
‘normal’ for the loser to agree with this. If the players see this convention as being
relevant to the play of the game they make the entitlement association. This means
the winner of the hash-mark game will choose alternative 2 much more often than
the loser, and vice versa. This results in a much higher matching percentage in the left
bottom cell of Table 1 (for a mathematical proof of the calculations see Appendix).
Table 1. Fractions of expected outcomes.
Player B
Alt. 1 Alt. 2
Player A Alt. 1 0.09 0.21
Alt. 2 0.21 0.49
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3.2. Experiment 2
In this version, the winner of the hash-mark game receives 4 euro, the loser still
receives nothing, and the money that the players can share in the distribution game is
7 euro in total, instead of 10.
Alt 1. You get € 3.- and your co-player gets € 4.-.
Alt 2. You get € 4.- and your co-player gets € 3.-.
Again, in a large population, the expected outcome by traditional game theory will
be that the players mix their strategies: alternative 1 will be played in 43 per cent of
the cases, and alternative 2 in 57 per cent of the cases, resulting in Table 2 that shows
the fractions for the different possible outcomes in the distribution game.
The possible financial rewards for both games show that the difference in payoff in
the second game is smaller than the difference in payoff in the first. In line with the
Lockean principle of distributive justice, people think that overall the winner of the
hash-mark game should still receive more than the loser. However, in the combination
of the hash-mark and the distribution game the total payoff to both players can be more
equal (Hobbes 1996). This has also shown up in many experiments (e.g. Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Huck and Oechssler 1999; Levine 1998). According to the associative
approach, if players use the labels of winner and loser (of the hash-mark game) the
winner will choose alternative 1 muchmore than the loser, and vice versa, resulting in a
much higher matching percentage in the right top cell in the table
4. Experimental results
The a-priori assumed relations that need to be analysed are shown in Figure 1.
To analyse whether players do make associations between games, the focus vari-
ables of the experiment should be on the outcome of the hash-mark game and the
outcome of the distribution game, without other interfering variables. Data on a
range of possible intervening variables (Sex, Faculty, Cultural background, and Risk-
averse behaviour) was collected and none of these had a significant impact on the
outcomes recorded in both versions of the experiment (see Appendix). Therefore,
two a-priori relations remain:
HM start → HM result: the player that starts the hash-mark game can always win (please try
it yourself to find out how), while the second player can only win if the starting player makes
a mistake. Given the coding of the variables the expected relation between the two is negative,
because if the hash-mark game start variable goes up – from the starting to the second player
– the result of the hash-mark game goes down – from winning to losing.
HM result→ distribution alternative: subjects will claim the larger share when they have won
the hash-mark game, and settle for the smaller share if they lost in version 1, i.e. a positive
relation, and vice versa in version 2, i.e. a negative relation.
We will now discuss the results of the two versions of the experiment.
Table 2. Fractions of expected outcomes.
Player B
Alt. 1 Alt. 2
Player A Alt. 1 0.184 0.245
Alt. 2 0.245 0.327
8 P. K. MARKS AND L. M. GERRITS
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ras
mu
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:2
8 1
2 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
4.1. Version 1
The participants did not figure out that they could always win if they started (see
Appendix), eliminating the possibility of the random device deciding who will be
winner or loser of the game. As such, the winner of the hash-mark game is indeed
recognized as having to put in the effort to win. The participants also did not learn
how to win the hash-mark game, or did not learn to take advantage of the no-
learning situation of the starters (see Appendix). That is, the relation of the starting
position in the hash-mark game and the winning position does not influence the
possible association that players can make between the hash-mark result and the
distribution alternative.
The entitlement association, i.e. the relation between HM result and Distribution
alternative, has a significant positive coefficient (see Appendix). That is, winners of
the hash-mark game chose the larger share almost 50 per cent more than losers, or,
vice versa, losers chose the smaller share almost 50 per cent more than winners. The
remaining significant relation is that the two groups, winners and losers, behave
differently when choosing an alternative (see Table 3).
The total percentages of alternatives 1 and 2 are almost the same as traditional game
theoretic prediction; i.e. winners (and losers) will choose alternative 1 in 30 per cent of the
cases and alternative 2 in 70 per cent of the cases. However, the choices made by the
different groups do differ from the total percentages. There is a 45.3 per cent difference in
choosing alternatives 1 or 2 for the group of losers compared to the winners (respectively,
Table 3. Alternatives chosen based on losing/winning HM-game.
Distribution alternative
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Total
HM result Lose Count 79 60 139
% within HM result 56.8% 43.2% 100%
Win Count 16 123 139
% within HM result 11.5% 88.5% 100%
Total Count 95 183 278
% within HM result 34.2% 65.8% 100%
Figure 1. A-priori assumed relations between all variables.
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56.8–11.5 per cent and 88.5–43.2 per cent). To assess whether the group behaviour deviates
from traditional game theory, the following hypotheses will be tested:
H0: Winners and losers will play according to traditional game-theoretic prediction:
pW0 = pL0 = 0.7.
H1: According to the associative approach winners (losers) will claim the larger share a lot
more: pW1 ≫ 0.7 (pL1 ≪ 0.7).
The observed proportion of winners (losers) choosing alternative two is 0.885
(0.432), which is outside the respective boundaries of 0.764 and 0.636. Stronger still:
the correlation even holds if the confidence area is extended to 99 per cent (sig-
nificance level of 1 per cent) making the boundaries 0.79 and 0.61, respectively. In
other words, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative corroborated. This
means that the decisions of the players, divided in losers and winners, in the second
game based on the history build-up in the first game as predicted by the associative
approach. Comments and remarks of participants in both the post-questionnaire and
the comment sheets of the experiment made clear that some participants always
claim seven when they win the hash-mark game and three when they lose.
A partial correlation check shows that participants do not use the association more
frequently in later rounds (ρ = −.031; p = .303; N = 275). However, the post-
questionnaire made clear that after a couple of rounds, or in hindsight, some
participants changed (or thought they should have changed) their tactics from always
claiming seven or three to basing their alternative on the result of the previous hash-
mark game. The substantial amount of associating players helped to create a higher
payoff in the subject pool. The result of the first game resonates in the second game
creating a payoff that is 0.67 euro higher (32 per cent) than what the players would
earn according to the expectations of the traditional game-theoretic perspective.
4.2. Version 2
As in the first version of the experiment, the participants did not figure out how to
win the hash-mark game when playing (see Appendix). The winners of the hash-
mark game were immediately rewarded with four euro, while the losers did not get
anything. Putting in the effort for winning the hash-mark game is thus immediately
rewarded, and does not undermine the possible egalitarian or entitlement position in
the distribution game, where the players have to agree on distributing seven euro.
The relation between HM result and Distribution alternative is significant at a 1 per
cent level. This means that being a winner or loser has a significant influence on the
alternative chosen. The correlation between the two variables confirms that in this
version the loser of the hash-mark game is more inclined to demand the larger compared
to the winner. Table 4 shows the amount and percentages of participants who lost or won
the hash-mark game and their respective alternatives chosen in the distribution game.
The total percentages of the chosen alternatives in this version of the experiment
are close to the average outcome expected by traditional game theory, i.e. winners
and loser will choose alternative 1 in approximately 43 per cent (3/7) of the cases and
alternative 2 in approximately 57 per cent (4/7). However, there is a 20.8 per cent
difference in choosing alternatives 1 or 2 for the group of losers compared to the
winners, respectively 59.4–38.6 per cent, and 61.4–40.6 per cent. To see whether this
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behaviour deviates significantly from traditional game theory for the winners (losers)
the following hypotheses will be tested:
H0: Winners and loser will play according to traditional game theoretic prediction:
H0 = pW1 = pL1 = 4/7.
H1: According the associative approach winners (losers) will claim the larger share a lot less:
H1 = pW1 ≪ 4/7 (pL1 ≫ 4/7).
The winners of the hash-mark game chose alternative 2 only 40.6 per cent times
compared to the boundary of 49 per cent. In other words, the frequency of winners
choosing alternative 2 is outside the confidence area (even at the 1 per cent sig-
nificance level), which means that the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative
hypothesis corroborated. The percentage of losers that chose alternative 2 is still
within the boundary at a significance level of 5 per cent, which means that the 5 per
cent difference between what traditional game theory and the associative approach
predict about the behaviour of the losers is not large enough, or the experimental
data is too small. This variance may be contributed to differences between behaviour
of losers and winners as the winners are aware of the 4 euro they receive for winning
the hash-mark game while the losers only know this subconsciously. Because the
losers do not have this extra information (readily available) in their frame to help
them solve the problem at hand, they tend to randomize between the two alternatives
rather than opting for alternative two.
Similar to version 1, the individual participants did not start using the possible associa-
tion more frequently in later combinations during play (ρ = −0.000; p = .498; N = 199).
While not all participants make the egalitarian association, the total money amount
generated in this version is significantly higher than the outcome expected by traditional
game theory. That is, the group of associating players helps make the total financial
earnings nearly 2 euro, 30 eurocents higher than when all participants would behave as
expected by traditional game theory.
5. Implications and extensions
As example, March (1994) and many others have shown in the realm of organization,
management and decision-making: history build-up between public actors is very real but
the exact dynamics behind it need to be carefully researched. The experimental results
show that players, as proxy for the decision-makers discussed in the introduction, con-
sciously use information of the history build-up in the combination of the two games. That
is, in the first version the players clearly couple the first and second game. Here, we see
Holland’s internal model as presented in Section 2 at work: the history build-up causes
Table 4. Alternatives chosen based on losing/winning HM-game.
Distribution alternative
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Total
HM result Lose Count 39 62 101
% within HM result 38.6% 61.4% 100%
Win Count 60 41 101
% within HM result 59.4% 40.6% 100%
Total Count 99 103 202
%within HM result 49.0% 51.0% 100%
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players to associate between the games, and provides them beliefs that their opponent has
certain associations. These frames of the players, i.e. the possible decisions they can make
and that they think the other player can make, helps them resolve the distribution problem
much better. In other words: their refined internal models help them cope with the
complexity of coupled arenas. Although slightly weaker than in the first version of the
experiment, the players in the second version are also better in matching. However, this is
mainly due to history build-up over the two games: the winners choose the lower share
much more often than the larger share. In other words, the frame through which the
winners looked at the second game builds on the association and coupling of the two. This
results in an overall higher matching of alternatives, even though the decisions, rooted in a
shared history, are not always in full alignment. Overall, the framing of the players and the
beliefs of the frames of other players and the possible associations these players can make
between the coupled games helps players focusing on particular outcomes in favour of
randomization (cf. focal points by Schelling 1960) or it helps break a deadlock (cf. Gerrits
and Marks 2017). As such, it demonstrates that players as actors develop internal models
that help them to deal with two coupled arenas in which two very different decision-
making processes take place.
Even though the formal model and the corresponding experiment seem to be a
major reduction of the complexity of decision-making processes in real cases, it does
help in understanding the intricacies of actors trying to find clues in order to help
them reach (better) results. Let us return to the high-speed rail case from the
introduction. The package deal – in the shape of a deeper estuary for the Belgians
and track alignment favoured by the Dutch – is quite common in public adminis-
tration and management literature. We can now understand such a package deal in
terms of decision-making in coupled arenas. They have build-up history in the two
separate arenas which helps them make associations between the possible problem
and solution definitions for the respective issues and as such their framing. This
partitions their set of action possibilities that helps them resolve the respective
deadlocks. In other words: their refined internal models help them navigating the
complexity of the two decision-making processes in the coupled arenas. Decision-
making in the first arena shaped the structure in the second arena.
Naturally, the research presented here should be extended. The formal model can be
tested in increasinglymore realistic situations instead of controlled experimental situations.
It is worth incorporating into the model the possibility of prior experience that contributes
to the internal model of the actors. For example, there is a long history of bilateral
negotiations about cross-boundary issues between the Netherlands and Belgium, so the
decision-making in the two arenas didn’t comeout of the blue. Some (Belgian) civil servants
would even refer to the treaty of 1848 between the two countries as a foundation for why
they went for certain decision alternatives. This joint history influences the frames with
which the respective actors enter the arena and as such predefines possible associations they
can make. This, in turn, limits their action space. A shared background means that the
decision-makers position themselves differently to other decision-makers, or that their
frame is already predefined in comparison to a situation where this background is absent.
The frame of reference also means decision-makers are likely to seek alignment with other
decision-makers based on history build-up (cf. Henry, Lubell, and McCoyy 2011).
Another addition to the model that could be tested would be to incorporate commu-
nication prior to the actual decision-making. Prior communications would find their way
in the frames that actors have at their disposal. Players will find out what possible
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associations others have due to communication, possibly enhancing their frame. After all, it
is extremely unlikely that decision-makers would be able to enter the final decision-stage
unbiased, uninformed, and uncoordinated. The testing of the model that incorporates
prior communications would enhance understanding of the associations and the actions by
the actors. Lastly, extending the amount of players, the number of options available and/or
the diversity of interaction situations is needed to do justice to the empirical richness of
collective decision-making (cf. Malatesta 2012). For example, the number of actors
involved in the two arenas discussed here run into the double digits and the space of
possible outcomes was also considerable and changeable as new options became available
and others disappeared due to external forces.
6. Conclusion
We started this article with the observation that part of the complexity of collective
decision-making comes from actors moving back and forth between coupled arenas
and the updating of their internal model to become more effective in dealing with
that complexity in order to reach their goals. To research this coupledness, we
followed the game theoretical approach favoured in the complexity sciences and
presented the associative approach. The associative approach was modelled and
then tested in an experiment. In the last step, we discussed the implications of the
experimental results for understanding complex coupled decision-making processes.
The results show that the history build-up in the first setting between the decision-
makers creates focal points for the next setting. This helps the actors in the decision-
making process to better align choices. In other words: history is key. We have
demonstrated that the associative approach in this model can explain at least a
fraction of the behaviour of decision-makers interacting in complex situations.
The formal model developed for this article helps conjecturing on what may be
necessary, but does not yet provide full answers to all facets of decision-making in
coupled arenas. Both theoretical and empirical research is needed in order to extend
the initial model of the associative approach.
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Appendix
Formal model
Players have a possible set of actions they can undertake, which is finite and given by ∑ = {1,. . .,
m}. Based on the connection with a previous different game, players make associations for the
decisions they can make in the current game. Each of these associations induces a partition of ∑.
A basic partition is a partition of ∑ induced by a single association. B denotes the set of basic
partitions. A typical element of B will be denoted β. ‘Nature’ predetermines the probabilities
with which players see certain associations. Players may learn from playing previous games and
incorporate this into their approach of later games. If players have learned that there is a
possible association they can make between the games, this means that in a later combination
– not necessarily between the same two players – nature assigns different availabilities to the
players. The frame of a player is denoted by F, which is an arbitrary subset of B. The probability
of all associations that are possible in F come to mind of player is denoted by V(F): The
availability of F. player believes that the other player holds the same associations as himself, or
less, i.e. the other player is said to be type G, G ⊆ F. Given that the player is of type F, the
conditional probability that the other player is of type G is denoted by V(G | F). The availability
of association β is denoted by vβ, hence an association β that is not available is denoted by (1 –
vβ). It is assumed that the availabilities of the different associations are not dependent on each
other. The probabilities V(F) and V(G | F) can be stated if we write vβ for the availability of
association β.
VðFÞ ¼
Y
β2F vβ
Y
β2FnGð1 vβÞ
V GjFð Þ ¼
Y
β2F vβ
Y
β2FnGð1 vβÞ for G  F
V GjFð Þ ¼ Undefined for G 6 F
“The expected payoff for a type F player is given by
πiðpðÞjFÞ ¼
X
GF VðGjFÞ  πðpiðFÞ; piðGÞÞ;
where pi(F) denotes the randomization chosen by type F, p−i(G) denotes the randomization chosen
by type G and π(pi(F), p−i(G)) denotes the players’ expected payoff when these randomizations are
chosen.” (Janssen 2001, 127).
Do note that: Availabilities are defined between zero and one, which needs some explana-
tion because an association is in the frame of a player, or not. However, the idea of availability
can be seen as nature programming the player to ‘assign’ probabilities to other players having
certain associations in their frame. In other words, nature determines the player’s beliefs about
the cognitive capacities of other players. For instance, nature determines the following think-
ing for a player: I think that there is a 70 per cent chance that the other player makes and uses
this particular association. For this player it would mean that the availability of this particular
association would be v = 0.7. Another way of looking at the idea of availability is that in a
population the average probability of members of this population making a particular associa-
tion is, for instance, 0.7. Given shared background, players have this particular association
available with 0.7, and not available with 0.3. An association can be labelled, or be perceived
as, more prominent when it is more available. However, when the availabilities of, for instance,
two associations are 0.6 0.7, respectively, one cannot say that the second is more prominent
than the first: They are both prominent. Intuitively thinking, when the difference in avail-
ability is large, one can say that one of the two is more prominent. But this does not prevent
the possibility that players can coordinate/match by using a less available association.
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Calculations of associative approach in experiment 1
The strategy a player will adopt depends on the associations in his frame and the conditional
probabilities of the other player having (a subset of) his frame, i.e.:
The calculation of the expected payoffs for both players when they claim either the larger or
the smaller share of the money can be depicted in the following equations, where πi is the
expected payoff for player i (i = w, l), where w is the winner and l is the loser of the hash-
mark game.
πw 7ð Þ ¼ 1 v1ð Þ 1 v2ð Þ
21
10 þ v1 1 v2ð Þ7þ v2 1 v1ð Þ0þ v1v2X
πw 3ð Þ ¼ 1 v1ð Þ 1 v2ð Þ
21
10 þ v1 1 v2ð Þ0þ v2 1 v1ð Þ3þ v1v2X
πl 7ð Þ ¼ 1 v1ð Þ 1 v2ð Þ
21
10 þ v1 1 v2ð Þ0þ v2 1 v1ð Þ7þ v1v2X
πl 3ð Þ ¼ 1 v1ð Þ 1 v2ð Þ
21
10 þ v1 1 v2ð Þ3þ v2 1 v1ð Þ0þ v1v2X
The last term denoted by X is unspecified, because one is not able to determine what the outcome
will be: The outcome depends on what the player believes the probabilities of the other player having
the associations are. To be able to specify the claims, the last term (X) of the equations can be
specified by showing the cases in which the minimum of one claim (i.e. X = 0) exceeds the
maximum of the other (X = claim maximum). In these cases it is always rational to act according
to the claim, because the expected payoff of following it is always higher, i.e. it is a dominant
strategy. It is rational for the winner to claim seven if the minimum expected payoff of claiming
seven is equal to or exceeds the maximum expected payoff of claiming three. In formula: min πw (7)
≥max πw (3), which is satisfied if:
v2  7v13þ 7v1 :
It is rational for the winner of the hash-mark game to claim the smaller share in the distribution
game, if max πw (7) ≤min πw (3), which is satisfied if:
v2  7v13þ 7v1 :
For the loser of the hash-mark game, it is rational to claim the smaller share when max πw (7) ≤min
πw (3), and the larger share when min πw (7) ≥max πw (3), which are satisfied if
v2  3v17þ3v1 , respectively, v2  3v177v1 .
● no association → (1 – v1)(1 – v2) 0 ≤ v1, v2 ≤ 1
● entitlement association → v1(1 – v2)
● egalitarian association → v2(1 – v1)
● both associations
→ v1v2
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Coding variables
Results analyses variables version 1:
Correlation HM start and HM result: 278 (N) valid entries to test the correlation. Starting players
win almost 8 per cent more than players that go second. The one-sided significance (p) is 0.094, and
thus is the relation not significant in a 95 per cent confidence interval.
Correlation results game to each individual players: The relation for each individual player is not
significant (ρ = −0.000; p = .499; N = 275). Starting players did not learn how to win the game (ρ =
.089; p = .149; N = 136). And the players who go second in the hash-mark game did not learn how to
take advantage of the no-learning situation of the starters (ρ = .091; p = .291; N = 136).
Correlation HM result and Distribution alternative. When the result of the hash-mark game goes
up (the variable is coded as 0 = lost HM, and 1 = won HM) the alternative chosen in the distribution
game goes up (coding: 1 = alternative 1, and 2 = alternative 2). The corrected coefficient is 0.482 (ρ =
.000; N = 275).
Correlations
Start hash-mark game 1 = Start
2 = Second
Result hash-mark game 0 = Lose
1 = Win
Distribution alternative 1 = Alternative 1
2 = Alternative 2
Distribution result 0 = Non-matching offers
1 = Matching offers
Sex 0 = Male
1 = Female
Cultural background 0 = Dutch
1 = Non-native Dutch
Risk behaviour alternatives 0 = € 3.- for sure
1 = Toss of coin 20 vs. 0
Faculty 1 = Economics
2 = Business administration
3 = Law
4 = History & Arts
5 = Economics & Law
6 = Philosophy
Possible association version 1 0 = Lost HM & chose alternative 2
Won HM & chose alternative 1
1 = Lost HM & chose alternative 1
Won HM & chose alternative 2
Possible association version 2 0 = Lost HM & chose alternative 1
Won HM & chose alternative 2
1 = Lost HM & chose alternative 2
Won HM & chose alternative 1
Risk behaviour Cultural background HM start
Sex Pearson Correlation −.122 .195 .000
Sig. (2-tailed) .408 .183 1.000
N 48 48 278
Risk behaviour Pearson Correlation −.209 .018
Sig. (2-tailed) n.a. .155 .769
N 48 278
Cultural background Pearson Correlation −.026
Sig. (2-tailed) n.a. n.a. .669
N 278
18 P. K. MARKS AND L. M. GERRITS
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ras
mu
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:2
8 1
2 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
One-way ANOVA test of Faculty
Correlations distribution alternative
One-way ANOVA test of Faculty
Results analyses variables version 2:
Correlation HM start and HM result: starting players (ρ = .022; p = .412; N = 100) or the second
player (ρ = .023; p = .821; N = 100)
Correlations
One-way ANOVA test of Faculty
Correlations
F Sig. N
Sex 2.339 .087 46
Cultural background 1.769 .167 46
Risk behaviour 1.776 .166 46
HM start 1.059 .367 272
Distribution alternative
Cultural background Pearson Correlation −.045
Sig. (1-tailed) .229
N 278
Risk behaviour Pearson Correlation .059
Sig. (1-tailed) .162
N 278
F Sig. N
Distribution alternative 1.189 .314 272
Cultural background HM start
Sex Pearson Correlation .130 −.077
Sig. (2-tailed) .379 .199
N 36 278
Cultural Background Pearson Correlation −.042
Sig. (2-tailed) n.a. .489
N 278
F Sig. N
Sex 2.267 .141 35
Cultural background 0.110 .742 35
HM start 0.117 .733 208
Distribution alternative
Sex Pearson Correlation −.055
Sig. (1-tailed) .181
N 274
Cultural Pearson Correlation −.050
background Sig. (1-tailed) .205
N 274
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Correlation HM result and Distribution alternative: Corrected correlation for the almost significant
(p = .084) variable sex is – 0.228 (p = .001; N = 199), which means that when the result of the hash-
mark game goes up, from 0 for losing to 1 for winning, the other variable goes down from
alternative 2 to alternative 1 by almost 23%.
One-way ANOVA test of Faculty
F Sig. N
Distribution alternative .077 .781 207
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